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Musical Events and Perceptual Ecologies. 
Eric Clarke, Faculty of Music, University of Oxford 
 
Abstract 
This paper, followed by two responses, discusses the application of ecological 
theory to an understanding of a number of issues in the aesthetics of music. It 
argues for an understanding of music as based in event perception, with an 
expanded conception of the sources that are specified by those events. Building 
on the theory of affordances, it considers the limitations of an information 
theoretic conception of musical complexity, discusses the importance of 
perceptual learning (understood as shaping by a structured environment) in 
understanding the affordances of music for different listeners, and raises the 
challenging problem of the terms in which musical materials might be 
appropriately described. The apparent tension between ecological and aesthetic 
positions – in which adaptation and accommodation seem to be at odds with the 
Modernist aesthetic perspective which prioritises the unsettling and de-
familiarising function of art – is confronted, before the paper concludes with 
some observations about different disciplinary perspectives on aesthetics, and 
matters of specificity and generality. 
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Aesthetics – certainly as it applies to music – has since its earliest Western 
beginnings been closely associated with questions of perception. Classical Greek 
writers (Plato, Aristotle, Aristoxenus among them) were preoccupied with how 
music affects people, as well as with more idealised notions of music’s materials 
and organising principles. Similarly, Alexander Gottlieb Baumgarten – often 
credited with being the source of the Enlightenment (and post-Enlightenment) 
conception of aesthetics – also understood aesthetics as being intimately bound 
up with ‘the science of what is sensed and imagined’ (Guyer 2016), rather than 
with more abstract notions of beauty and value, as the subject has often been 
portrayed. But what approach to perception  might be fruitful as a basis for 
aesthetic questions? The last twenty-five years or so has seen the steady 
development of work that has addressed the perception of music from a broadly 
ecological perspective (e.g. Balzano 1986; Clarke 1987, 2005, 2012; Windsor 2000; 
Reybrouck 2005, 2012; Krueger 2014), though seldom in a way that engages 
explicitly with aesthetic concerns. In this paper I examine some principles of 
perception from a broadly ecological perspective, considering the mutualism of 
perceivers and their environments (including the aesthetic characteristics of 
those environments); the ecological principle of affordance and its relevance to 
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music; the relationship between accommodation and critique within aesthetics; 
and finally some consequences of different disciplinary orientations. 
 
Event Perception and Music  
For organisms trying to flourish in an uncertain world, perception is 
fundamentally concerned with picking up what’s going on in the world, and 
what to do about it. And ‘what is going on’, as well as what to do about it, is 
thoroughly relational, dialectically specified in the environmental information 
that is available with reference to the capacities of the organism. If on a warm 
day I notice a nicely placed and comfortable-looking chair, I may go over and sit 
on it to relax in the sun for a while. If I am a slightly overheated spaniel, I may 
notice the enticing pool of shade cast by this same four-legged object, and go 
over to lie on the cool ground that offers itself up under that conveniently placed 
horizontal surface. The chair-ness and sit-ability of the object that I notice as a 
human are specified in (i.e. are lawfully related to) the reflected light arriving at 
my visual system: the wood and metal of the object, and its consequent capacity 
to support human-scale weight; its human-scale height off the ground; the angle 
between its seat and back, specifying anticipated comfort; and so on.1 Equally, 
the shadiness and lie-under-ability that I might notice as a dog are specified by 
the dark patch under an appropriately elevated (relative to my spaniel body size) 
horizontal roof that I can easily walk beneath to flop down. The different 
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opportunities that this notionally identical object offers are specified in the lawful 
relationship between the optical array and the size (low enough to sit on/high 
enough to get under), orientation (horizontal) and illumination (in the 
sun/shaded) of the object as seen from my perspective as either a human or a 
dog. And my actions in relation to it (sitting on it, flopping down under it) enact 
its meaning for me (warm relaxing chair; cool shady place). 
Perception, then, is about discovering and acting upon the world’s events 
(Bingham 2000; Chemero 2000) and meanings (what’s going on and what to do 
about it), and to listen to music is to engage perceptually with music’s events and 
meanings (what’s going on in this music, and what to do about it). Perceptual 
principles can account for the ways in which listeners perceive structural 
processes in music, but in a more far-reaching manner people also listen to the 
ways in which musical sounds specify the wider world of which they are a part – 
and the sounds of music specify a huge diversity of objects and events: the 
instruments and recording media from which they emanate, the musical styles to 
which they belong, the social functions in which they participate, the emotional 
states and bodily actions of their performers, the spaces and places in which they 
are found, the discourses with which they are intertwined. Because instruments, 
bodies, loudspeakers, stages, cathedrals, and clubs are palpably physical, there is 
little difficulty in accepting them as sources that are specified in sound. I hear the 
sound of a drum kit, of vibrato, of a club as I pass its doorway. But there is more 
resistance to the idea that cultures, social practices, emotional states and 
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ideological allegiances could be conceived as ‘sources’ (things that are specified 
in sound) because they seem too abstract, too non-material. This is unnecessarily 
restrictive: cultures, emotions and ideologies are not only material, but they are 
all manifest in material forms of one sort or another, amongst which there are the 
sounds of those phenomena. Vienna around 1900, or 1960s American 
minimalism, or the 2007 British dubstep scene are all cultures and sub-cultures 
that are manifest in, expressed through, and constructed by material forms 
(images, buildings, technological artifacts, language, clothing, hair styles) to 
which perceivers can be more or less attuned - and musical sounds are one of 
those material forms. These cultures and sub-cultures (and instruments, bodies, 
emotional expressions, social practices) are the sources of those sounds, since they 
constitute the conditions and circumstances that give rise to the music, and are 
specified in those sounds. In the same way, a cadence in A minor, a verse and 
chorus, or a Gavotte rhythm can be regarded as the sources of a sound that a 
listener hears – as being events that are specified in sound.  
 The structuralist orientation of both traditional musicology and the 
psychology of music has meant that both disciplines have tended to confine 
themselves to a consideration of the immediate sources that lie either within an 
individual work, or a style. In this respect, both traditions adopt a view of music 
as autonomous. By contrast, an ecological perspective addresses both immanent 
properties in music and also a far wider and more diverse range of other sources 
- without abandoning a commitment to the material manner in which these 
 6 
sources are specified. Ecological theory focuses on the particular invariants - 
distributed over different timespans - that specify different sources. A number of 
studies (Gjerdingen & Perrott 2008; Krumhansl 2010; Plazak & Huron 2011) have 
shown that so-called ‘high level’ attributes of music, such as genre, style, or 
cultural origin can be identified extremely quickly (often due to the manner in 
which they are specified by timbre) – much more quickly than supposedly more 
‘basic’ attributes such as metre or tonality. It may require a longer stretch of 
music for someone to perceive that it is the Kronos Quartet playing than to 
perceive that there is a cello being played: but that does not imply a difference of 
level or abstraction. It may simply be that the invariant properties that specify 
the Kronos Quartet are not present at the start of the sound, or are distributed 
over a longer timespan.  
 Lastly, the objects and processes specified in sound may belong either to a 
real world or to a virtual world. Imagine that you are sitting in your room and a 
motorbike goes past in the street outside. It is uncontroversial to assert that the 
sounds arriving at your auditory system are structured in such a way that they 
specify a motorbike (to a listener enculturated into a world that has motorbikes, 
and who is attuned to the sound of motorbikes through perceptual learning – see 
below), and that the motorbike that they specify has a tangible and concrete 
reality that can be confirmed by going to the window to watch it go past. This is 
a motorbike in the real world. Now suppose that you download a soundclip 
called ‘passing motorbike’ and play it through your sound system. Depending 
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on the quality of both the clip and the sound system, the acoustical information 
may be almost identical to the first case, but the motorbike that is specified has 
no existence in an immediate real world: nothing has actually moved, no real 
space has been traversed – however perceptually convincing it may be.2 It is a 
motorbike in a virtual world – rather like the virtual images that obervers see 
when they look in a mirror. Recorded music specifies objects and events in a 
virtual world (as do films, television and video games in the equivalent visual 
domains). But even live instrumental music can specify a virtual world, as the 
sense of motion and space in music demonstrates. When, at the start of the first 
movement of Beethoven’s Ninth Symphony, for example, we hear the bare A/E 
fifths of the strings, horns and woodwind, to which is added the descending line 
across the strings moving from A to E, down to a lower A and a lower E, and so 
on, gradually filling the musical texture, what is the textural ‘space’ that this 
material fills, and within what space does the downward movement of string 
line take place? The answer is: a virtual space, and one which can be thought of 
as helping to constitute ‘the world of the work’ – an idea to which I return 
toward the end of this paper. 
 
Commonalities and Distinctions: Perceptual Learning 
The mutualism of perceiver and environment (a fundamental principle of 
ecological theory) means that different perceivers at different times will be 
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attuned to different invariants. We all have the potential to hear different things 
in the same music - but the fact that we don’t (or at least not all the time) is an 
indication of the degree to which we share a common cultural ecosystem, by 
which we are all similarly shaped. This commonality is only partial, and the 
explicit mutualism that characterizes an ecological approach means that listening 
must be considered in relation to the capacities of particular listeners, and 
particular groups of listeners, rather than in general or abstracted terms. 
 How and why listeners share perceptual sensitivities in relation to music, 
and are also more or less idiosyncratic in their perceptual attunement, is a 
question of perceptual learning. The vast majority of human beings are 
biologically endowed with overwhelmingly the same perceptual capacities and 
potential at birth. But exposure to the environment powerfully shapes our 
perceptual capacities – from day one and for the rest of our lives.3 And this is as 
true of our auditory (and musical) environments as of any other aspect of our 
world. Perceptual learning (which was extensively studied by Eleanor Gibson – 
e.g. E. J. Gibson 1969; and for a substantial review of recent ecological 
developmental theory see Szokolszky & Read 2018) can be understood as the 
differentiation of attention: at birth, human infants have relatively blunt, if 
powerful, perceptual (and motor) capacities which are intensely focused on a 
limited number of domains (hunger, comfort, sources of sustenance and 
companionship, etc.). Exposure to a highly structured environment shapes and 
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differentiates these capacities, with the result that the developing infant (and 
later adult) becomes sensitive to distinctions in the environmental information 
that were ‘always there’ – but to which the perceiver had no access/sensitivity. 
Rather than conceiving of this as as the acquisition of knowledge, to be accessed 
activated by memory, it can be regarded as a sophisticated kind of shaping.  
By analogy, consider those trees that are often found in places that have 
constant prevailing winds, such as on exposed coastlines, and which have been 
shaped by the wind. Their branches often grow almost parallel to the ground, 
shaped or driven by the wind and offering less damaging resistance to it than if 
they grew more vertically. As a result, the wind flows over the surface of the tree 
in a different pattern than would be the case were the tree to be more vertical, 
and the tree therefore continues to grow in an altered manner. Furthermore, the 
tree itself will cast a different patch of shade and shelter from the elements than it 
otherwise would, providing an ecological niche for other organisms (shade-
loving ferns, mosses and lichens, and the organisms that live amongst them). 
Both of these consequences (altered wind flow resulting in altered growth 
pattern, and shady shelter) illustrate the reciprocal relationship between 
dynamically changing organisms and their dynamically changing environments 
(see e.g. Lombardo 1987).4 In analogous manner, an infant born into an early 
twenty-first century British environment (for example) will be shaped by the 
‘wind’ of that culture in profound and continuous ways, and will in turn act 
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within and upon that ‘wind’ in continually shaped and shaping ways. In 
specifically musical terms, this will almost certainly mean an early and constant 
exposure to the veritable hurricane of tonal and rhythmic structures and 
processes in which we live our lives, and which shape our musical sensitivities 
so profoundly. And this shaping – apparently passive in one sense (it is mostly 
an ‘unsupervised’ kind of shaping and learning) – is in reality as active as it is 
receptive: once shaped by and attuned to a particular musical environment, we 
seek out the niches in that environment in which we feel comfortable or which 
excite us, and avoid those niches that seem strange, incomprehensible or 
threatening; and with our voices and any other music-making resources that we 
find to hand (surfaces to bang on, instruments to play, software to run) we 
contribute to and perhaps modify those niches – or even construct appealing 
niches of our own. 
 
Physical and Ecological Descriptions of Musical Materials 
How might the musical materials with which we engage be appropriately 
described within an ecological framework? The dominating influence of the 
physical sciences makes it all too easy to assume that standard acoustical 
descriptions of sounds are the appropriate ones to use in perceptual research - 
endorsed by the precision and technological sophistication of the instruments 
from which they are often derived. But an important distinction needs to be 
drawn between two kinds of acoustics: physical acoustics and ecological 
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acoustics. The spectrum photographs of passages of music shown in Cogan 
(1984), for instance, are concerned with physical acoustics. They illustrate 
physical facts about musical sounds, and can make no claims about the relevance 
of what is shown for a human listener. Imagine a spectrum photo with a 
fascinating and highly structured pattern of activity in a frequency range that is 
beyond the limits of human hearing. The photo is not a false representation of 
the stimulus, but it has no relevance for human listeners.  
A similar point might be made about complexity – an issue that is 
germane both to questions of perception and aesthetics. How might perceptual 
complexity be theorised and perhaps measured? And what is the role of 
complexity in aesthetics? Figures 1 and 2 (from McAdams, Depalle & Clarke, 
2004) show spectrograms of short sections of Ravel’s Bolero and Kraftwerk’s “Die 
Roboter” from The Man-Machine (1978).5 While these representations provide a 
great deal of information about the distribution of intensity (shown as darkness) 
and frequency (vertical axis) in time (horizontal axis), and approximate to a 
comprehensive representation of the physical energy in the signal, they are of 
little value in trying to gauge the relative complexity of these two slices of music. 
One (the Kraftwerk) looks more clearly defined and more varied, and perhaps on  
<Figures 1 and  2 about here> 
that basis might suggest greater complexity. But all this spectral information 
conveys little or nothing about the musical events taking place in the two extracts 
(snare drum sounds, wind instruments, Spanish rhythm, etc. in one; synth 
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sounds, futuristic electronica, reverberation, etc. in the other) – and it is the 
organisation, and wider cultural-ecological resonance, of those musical events 
that determines their perceived complexity. Influenced by a general enthusiasm 
for information theory in the 1960s, Leonard Meyer (1967) and Abraham Moles 
(1966) both presented attempts to understand musical complexity in terms of 
information theory, arguing the case for relating information-based complexity 
to aesthetic value – an approach that continues to find a place in more recent 
work by Eugene Narmour (Narmour 1990) and David Huron, for example 
(Huron 2006). But information theory, while attractively explicit about how the 
information content of an event can be defined (as the reciprocal of its 
probability), runs into hopeless difficulties when applied to the reality of actual 
musical materials. The event-to-event probabilities in the theme from Ravel’s 
Bolero, for example, are – in ecological and perceptual terms – utterly different 
when a listener has arrived at the middle of the piece (cf. Fig 1), by comparison 
with the start, since by that point in the music a listener has already heard the 
rhythm and melody of the theme repeated many times. 
More than that, an information theory approach has no capacity to take 
account of the wider cultural resonances/references of any of the material in this 
(or any other) music. A waltz or a march heard in the context of a Mahler 
symphony has a very different aesthetic and cultural complexity than it does at a 
New Year’s eve ball or a military parade; just as the ‘doo-wop’ music performed 
by Frank Zappa and the Mothers of Invention on their 1970 album Burnt Weeny 
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Sandwich has a different aesthetic and cultural complexity than it does when 
performed by Randy and The Rainbows (e.g. their 1963 hit ‘Denise’).6  The 
Zappa is a parody of this music (and perhaps also a curious kind of celebration 
of it), and this can direct the attention of a listener to different features of the 
music in the two cases: the exaggerrated and ludicrous quality of the falsetto 
singing, and banal lyrics and rhyme schemes in the Zappa, for example; and 
perhaps the vocal quality/blend and semitone harmonic shift halfway through 
the track in the case of The Rainbows.  These differences are, of course, 
dependent on the cultural attunement of the listeners under consideration: a 
listener with no previous experience of Western music might hear little or no 
difference in complexity between a waltz in a Mahler symphony and a standard 
ballroom waltz; and someone who mostly listens to opera, or early music, and 
who has heard little or no pop music might hear no significant difference 
between the Zappa and Rainbows tracks. Complexity is a relational attribute that 
is a function of perceivers’ sensitivities/competences in relation to 
environmental information. The same musical materials afford widely differing 
degrees of complexity to listeners with different listening skills, orientations and 
histories of perceptual learning. 
Ecological acoustics – by contrast with physical acoustics – is the attempt 
to describe the properties of the environment in terms that are relevant to the 
perceptual capacities of the organism in question, a matter that is clearly species 
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specific. James Gibson pointed out that phenomena can be described at scales 
ranging from the subatomic, to the cosmic, but that ‘the appropriate scale for 
animals is the intermediate one of millimeters to kilometers, and it is appropriate 
because the world and the animal are then comparable.’ (Gibson 1966: 22) The 
general principle of ecological scale is an important counter to the belief that 
properties of perceptual objects must be significant simply because they can be 
shown to be there by a physical measuring device – and ‘scale’ is just one 
(relatively simple) aspect of what might be called ecological salience.  What is 
needed is a systematic investigation of the stimulus properties that directly 
inform musical behaviours (including musical judgements), by analogy with 
other ecological investigations of the properties of the visual world that inform 
the successful co-ordination of perception and action (as, for example, in catching 
a ball). There is already some work that has made progress in this direction (e.g. 
Gaver 1993a, 1993b; Dibben 2001; Windsor and de Bézenac 2012), but there is still 
to a long way go – and there are significant problems to be addressed in defining 
how general or specific the ‘user group’ is assumed to be. Describing the 
affordances of the 1995 track ‘Hell is round the corner’, by Tricky (which is based 
around a sample from a 1971 Isaac Hayes song, and which features a deliberately 
emphasized ‘vinyl’ crackliness) is very different for someone who is attuned to 




Perceptual Theory and Aesthetic Interpretation: Music’s Affordances 
Is there a way in which an ecological perceptual approach might relate to the 
aesthetics of interpretation? At first sight it might seem that aesthetic 
interpretation should be incompatible with ecology, but the ecological approach 
can provide a ‘grounding’ that limits the infinite room for interpretative 
manoeuvre, and thereby helps to break the vicious circle that potentially 
undermines the whole enterprise. If everything is interpretation, then there are 
no constraints and we are in a relativistic free-for-all where the loudest or 
ideologically most powerful voice dominates. What Nicholas Cook (2002) has 
called the ‘Scylla and Charybdis’ of inherent versus socially constructed theories 
of meaning in music can be avoided by recognising that ecological principles can 
help to explain why interpretations don’t just spread unchecked in every 
possible direction. Ecological theory offers the possibility of a different approach, 
based on the principle of affordances. 
James Gibson coined the term ‘affordance’ to stand for the opportunities, 
functions and values that a perceiver detects in the environment. The concept 
depends on the mutual relationship between the needs and capacities of the 
organism, and the properties of objects and events. ‘An affordance is neither an 
objective property nor a subjective property; or it is both if you like. An 
affordance cuts across the dichotomy of subjective-objective and helps us to 
understand its inadequacy. It is equally a fact of the environment and a fact of 
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behavior. It is both physical and psychical, yet neither. An affordance points both 
ways, to the environment and to the observer.’ (Gibson 1979: 129) In the specific 
context of music, musical materials can be conceived as affording certain kinds of 
interpretations and not others.8 The much discussed recapitulation in the first 
movement of Beethoven’s Ninth Symphony that Cook (2002) uses as an example 
for his own approach, affords interpretation both as ‘murderous sexual rage’ 
(McClary 1991, cited in Cook 2002) and ‘the heavens on fire’ (Tovey 1935-9, cited 
in Cook 2002), but not, for instance, ‘world-weary indifference’; and the reason 
that it affords the first two interpretations but not the third is because the music 
has attributes that are consistent with the semantic requirements of some verbal 
interpretations and not others. Indifference and world-weariness have semantic 
requirements which this material cannot meet. 
Central to the definition of affordance is the idea that the perceiver/event 
relationship affords an action – a reflection of the more general ecological 
principle of the reciprocity of perception and action. In this sense, my own use of 
the term affordance in the paragraph above appears somewhat non-standard, 
referring as it does to the relationship between musical material and a socially 
constructed interpretation. But interpretation is also action – the speaking, 
writing, gesturing and grimacing in which interpretation is manifest (see  
Ramstead, Veissière and Kirmayer 2016; Rietveld and Kiverstein 2014). To be 
more accurate, then (and a bit pedantic), the recapitulation of the first movement 
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of Beethoven’s Ninth Symphony affords writing (or speaking) about it in terms 
of murderous sexual rage, or the heavens on fire. 
 Interpretative writing and speaking are forms of action, but of a 
comparatively discreet kind. In musicology, and aesthetics, they play a crucial 
role - indeed they more or less constitute these disciplines - but in the wider 
world a whole range of other actions are afforded by music, and it is these that 
play the more central role in most people’s lives. Music affords dancing, singing 
(and singing along), playing (and playing along), working, persuading, drinking 
and eating, doing aerobics, taking drugs, playing air guitar, travelling, 
protesting, seducing, waiting on the telephone, sleeping... the list is endless. 
These, as well as writing and speaking are what music affords, and what they 
demonstrate is the enacted character of musical meaning. So-called passive 
musical listening is a kind of listening that is typical of only a small proportion of 
listening even in Western culture. And even here it is an illusion: there really is 
no such thing as passive listening, or the ‘rapt contemplation’ that is its more 
loftily expressed counterpart, but only different varieties of more or less 
concealed or sublimated active engagement (as the evidence for the widespread 
activation of the human motor system during ‘passive’ listening indicates). 
Nonetheless, the Western art music tradition, with its sharp division of musical 
labour (specialist composers, performers and listeners), and the listening style 
with which it has become entwined, has had a cultural influence that vastly 
exceeds its actual currency.  
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 The myth of passive listening is strongest where music presents itself (or 
is socially constructed) as having no function: in other words within the aesthetic 
ideology of musical autonomy. In various guises, the ‘problem’ of autonomy 
remains a persistent and recurring theme: the closed world of purely musical 
sounds, versus the source-specifying sounds of everyday listening; the ‘special’ 
internal world of heightened subjectivity - idealised, escapist, a site of particular 
intensity; the virtual motion and virtual space of an encapsulated and hermetic 
musical world (often emblematically represented by Bach’s The Art of Fugue, or 
Beethoven’s late instrumental music); the ubiquitous acousmatic presentation of 
music (heard over loudspeakers or headphones, and divorced from the means of 
production) - each of these stands in relation to autonomy in one way or another. 
As a cultural construction, the idea of autonomy continues to perform a powerful 
aesthetic role, and remains both an ideological barrier and a dynamic force in the 
critical power of music. While autonomy and ecology seem so incompatible, 
ecological theory provides a way to understand how music is able to move 
seamlessly between degrees of autonomy and heteronomy by means of the same 
perceptual principles: sounds specify and afford - and can specify and afford 
sources and actions which are either predominantly immanent to the musical 
material, helping to constitute the (virtual) world of the work (see above); or are 
predominantly ‘worldly’ in a more tangible and actual manner.  
 While many aspects of people’s experience of Western concert music are 
amenable to an ecological analysis, nonetheless the autonomy to which this 
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music aspires - the self-sufficient integration that is both illusory and real - is at 
odds with the practical and survival-driven character of an ecological 
perspective. Because ecology is first and foremost about adapting to, and 
conforming with the world, it seems to run diametrically counter to the idea of 
art as critique, as a deliberate attempt to unsettle the relationship between people 
and their all-too-familiar environments – a fundamental aspect of Modernist and 
contemporary aesthetics (e.g. Adorno 1997). The critical value of art, from almost 
any perspective, is a function of its resistance to current conditions, its failure to 
conform to easy adaptation. If the ecological ideal is the optimally efficient 
mutual adaptation of organisms and their environments, then it is against the 
background assumption of this ideally adapted state that music attains its 
uncomfortable and critical power. It constitutes a virtual world in which ‘easy 
adaptation’ is explored, manipulated and deliberately thwarted in contrast to the 
ecological premise of adaptation and accommodation.  
 
General Principles and Specific Instances: an Afterword on Disciplinarity 
The Leverhulme Network to which this paper relates is an explicitly and 
deliberately interdisciplinary endeavour,9 and this contribution is quite 
obviously an engagement between psychology and musicology. There is much to 
be gained  from interdisciplinarity – in re-framing questions, overcoming 
disciplinary entrenchment, benefitting from good ideas in parallel domains, 
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discovering powerful new syntheses, and so on. But there are also tensions and 
challenges. A central feature of psychology (and one of the hallmarks of a 
science) that distinguishes it from musicology is that it is primarily focused on 
general principles rather than specific manifestations. At the level of individual 
pieces of research this may not always be evident: a paper may seem to be 
concerned with the ability of American college students to recognise and name 
specific pop music hits from the last 50 years (Krumhansl and Zupnick 2013); but 
the primary aim is to explore something much more general about 
autobiographical factors in human memory. By contrast, a considerable amount 
of work in musicology focuses on a detailed understanding of very particular 
phenomena. A study of formal structures in Schoenberg’s Pierrot Lunaire may 
engage with larger questions of convention and radicalism in the early twentieth 
century; but the emphasis is likely to be on the attributes of this specific piece – 
explored in considerable depth and with unapologetic particularity. This 
difference in perspective should offer an opportunity for fruitful 
complementarity. But it is often the case that the trade-off between broad 
explanatory power and local specificity leads psychological research on music to 
seem blandly obvious and lacking in critical awareness to musicologists; while 
psychologists point to the apparently arbitrary particularity of musicological 
research and its speculative and discursive character; and raise questions about 
empirical support, generalisability, and evidence. This is not an easy problem to 
solve; but in the approach that I have presented here I hope to have shown that 
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general ecological principles and the particularity of different listeners’ responses 
are not at odds with one another; and that paying careful attention to what 
musical sounds specify and how they do so, and what those sounds afford, is a 




Figure 1: Spectrogram of 4 seconds of Maurice Ravel’s Bolero just after Rehearsal 
Figure 9 in the score (around the mid-point of the piece). 
 
Figure 2: Spectrogram of 6 seconds of Kraftwerk’s “Die Roboter”, from near the 
start of the track (0:04 – 0:10).  
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Response to Eric Clarke’s  “Musical Events and Perceptual Ecologies” 
Alan E. Williams, School of Arts and Media, University of Salford 
 
Complexity, to a classical performer or composer usually has a very 
specific meaning, bound up with the density and predictability of musical 
material. A strand of contemporary composition (that of James Dillon, Brian 
Ferneyhough and others) has been termed “New Complexity”. Despite the many 
problems that exist with information theory as applied to music, as a composer I 
find it a useful concept in thinking about how the (or an) audience might 
respond to what I’m doing with musical material – mainly by varying the rate at 
which “new stuff” is introduced. As Eric Clarke puts it: “Complexity is a 
relational attribute that is a function of perceivers’ sensitivities/competences in 
relation to environmental information”. When I imagine an audience response, 
I’m also imagining their musical competency. We can’t know exactly how the 
music will be understood, and most composers understand that fully 
understanding their audience’s likely response is an impossibility. Clarke argues 
that: “What is needed is a systematic investigation of the stimulus properties that 
directly inform musical behaviours…”. Such a comprehensive investigation does 
not exist (some may say could not), and in its absence, composers must just take 
a punt at it, adjusting the level of complexity of musical material according to 
their gut instinct for what will be swallowed by their audience. Of course, we are 
 24 
also our own audience, and the ecological approach allows us to see this 
reciprocal relationship in action. 
Unfortunately, complexity has also been used at various times as a proxy 
for quality, with structural analysis of complexity being conflated with value 
judgement. It is probably harder to write a hit single than a new complexity style 
string quartet, if we are to judge from the likelihood of the two compositions 
achieving their musical goal, since simply to exist in performance is the goal of 
the latter, but the achievement of hit status requires the participation of the 
marketplace and of an audience of consumers. Yet the latter generates in 
Bourdieu’s terms enormous cultural capital, whereas the former only generates 
economic capital, and in the UK HE sector terms, the composer of the hit song 
would not be likely to have her work taken very seriously as research. 
If, as Clarke says, the meaning of anything is enacted by my actions in 
relation to it, how meaningful to the practising composer is the theoretical 
framework proposed by Clarke? Is it useful for composers to think of what they 
do in ecological terms? And what are the consequences for the idea of individual 
expression of thinking of music in this way? I’d like to try to address these 
questions which arise out of Clarke’s article and consider them in relation to a 
compositional act in which I am engaged while also writing this response. 
Firstly let us candidly admit that classical music has an audience problem: 
across the Western world, rates of audience participation in classical music are 
dropping. Contemporary classical music deriving from a modernist aesthetic 
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tends towards complexity of material, driven there by modernism’s valuing of 
individual expression, originality and in Adornian terms, resistance to 
commercial pressures (also noted by Clarke). Modernism was from the start 
characterised by anxiety in many ways, but Bartók’s oft-quoted question to 
Nielsen “Is my music modern enough?” can be taken as an example of the fear of 
negative judgement that drives many composers towards the complex and away 
from the more obviously communicative. Moreover, the more complex the 
musical material, the more time it takes to rehearse, and therefore, roughly 
speaking the music’s capacity to generate a sufficient audience to pay the 
musicians a reasonable amount for their time is in inverse proportion to its 
complexity. Viewed as an eco-system, then, contemporary classical music’s 
relationship to other musical subcultures is a parasitic one. 
The urgency of the audience problem in classical music is beginning to be 
addressed through ensembles such as the Manchester Collective, or series such 
as the BBC Philharmonic’s Red Brick Sessions at the University of Salford; and 
these attempts to address the problem of audiences for classical music and new 
music often involve a kind of re-contextualising of the music being performed, as 
well as a deliberate lowering of the status of the composer in advertising 
literature and so on. This de facto rejection of music’s supposed autonomous 
status and the authority of the composer is being done for pragmatic reasons: 
presenting music without comment or explanation in the expectation that an 
audience will appear (Who? From where?) to genuflect at the shrine of the great 
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composer doesn’t work any more. So encouraging composers to think in more 
ecological terms about what they do seems likely to improve the environment for 
classical music over the long term, since it might free them to think about what 
they do as a means of communication. 
As an example, I would like to discuss a string quartet I am currently 
engaged in writing, commissioned by the Hungarian Unitarian church as part of 
their celebration for the 450th anniversary of the Edict of Torda, the first 
proclamation of religious toleration.  The original idea of the commission was for 
a choral cantata, but when the choir dropped out a string quartet was proposed 
instead for purely pragmatic reasons. However, the string quartet has long been 
associated with the idea of music’s autonomy, and the commissioning of a new 
piece of ‘occasional music’ (i.e. music whose purpose is to commemorate 
something for a group of people) runs entirely counter to the string quartet’s 
assumed autonomous status. From Beethoven’s late quartets to Shostakovich’s 
cycle of fifteen quartets, the medium has been associated with many composers’ 
most intimate and personal musical expressions. It is also used to demonstrate 
technical knowledge – a kind of ars technica as well as ars poetica: Kurtág, for 
example, pointedly called his quartet written in 1958-9 his Opus 1, reflecting his 
rejection of the Kodály influence then dominating Hungarian composition in 
favour of more contemporary extended techniques. So on the one hand there is 
an anxiety caused by the expectation to ‘declare oneself’ as an individual artist 
both technically and aesthetically: can the string quartet I am about to write 
 27 
sound sufficiently original, personal, and technically accomplished for it to bear 
the name of string quartet? And on the other hand, the quartet will have to 
operate within certain constraints: the ensemble available is not particularly 
experienced in contemporary classical music, and will not have much time to 
rehearse; the audience will be theologians and ministers of religion for the most 
part, and have little experience of contemporary classical music. This generates a 
different anxiety – will the audience respond to the piece? Will the quartet do a 
good job in playing it? 
Thinking about music in ecological terms, then, has a number of useful 
consequences which alleviates this tension between the expectation of the string 
quartet to be an autonomous and timeless statement of musical expression; and 
the need to write a piece which works for this audience, on this occasion. Viewed 
as an ecological ‘niche’, then, the string quartet will have to respond to a number 
of different conditions. The ecological perspective allows the piece to be seen as a 
balancing of these various affordances, stripped of the value judgements and 
consequent anxieties derived from modernism (‘is my music modern enough?’). 
As an example of the way that this viewpoint allows a re-evaluation of the 
conditions of the creation of music, let’s look for a minute at the idea of the 
musical programme. Classical music has always had recourse to symbolism and 
narrative in attempting to appeal to audiences: for example, Liszt’s response to 
‘the growing gap between artist and public’ was the creation of the Symphonic 
Poem. We train our composers, though, not to explain their music according to 
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some authorial explanatory code; at undergraduate level, a musical piece 
accompanied by the inevitable commentary which consisted of a simple 
narrative would not get a good mark, regardless of how accomplished the music 
was when viewed as autonomous. Clarke’s example of Beethoven’s 9th affording 
a broad range of interpretations but excluding others might allow us to return to 
a kind of narrative symbolism that communicates well with non-specialist 
audiences without sacrificing music’s transcendent ability to symbolize many 
different things simultaneously. 
In the quartet I use a complex web of musical symbol and reference 
relevant to the occasion.  Methods include direct quotation (for example, a 
passage from a piece by John Ireland, who, I recently discovered, attended the 
same Unitarian chapel as a boy that I did); encoding of names (following the 
practice of 16th century counterpoint, the names of the 16th Century Religious 
reformer Dávid Ferenc/Franz Hertel as D-A-D F-E-E-C and F-A-E flat B , or H in 
German; a hymn tune, derived from these notes, but set in a Bach-era four-part 
harmony; and a secondary 12-note theme based around the augmented triad, 
that refers to Liszt’s 12-note experimentations, and by extension to the Faust 
myth, because Liszt used a theme made up of four augmented triads in his Faust 
symphony. Liszt is referred to because he performed several times in Kolozsvár 
(now Cluj, Romania, the location of the quartet’s premiere), and his likeness was 
used as the face of Dávid Ferenc in a famous painting by Aladár Körösfői-
Kriesch of the debate at Gyulafehérvár in 1568 which led to the proclamation of 
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the edict of Torda. The methods also include pentatonic material related to all the 
main themes, representing a dream recounted by the Hungarian Unitarian 
minister Balázs Ferenc in his 1929 book Bejárom a Kerék Világot (I travel the round 
world) after he heard music played on the Gu Zhang zither in China in 1928, 
which I also heard in China in 2016. Throughout there is a strong Bartókian 
flavour, particularly in the multiple polyphonic lines and long-short “Bulgarian” 
rhythms. 
I describe this complexity of reference, not with the intention to bewilder a 
non-Transylvanian Hungarian Unitarian audience – which is the ecological niche 
which this piece will inhabit - but to describe a type of complexity which is not 
necessarily a function of the music’s surface. The piece doesn’t need to be 
understood as a web of symbols, and could be interpreted in many other ways – 
but it is intended to work as an alternation between moods of contemplation, 
and dynamic polyphony.  
Finally, to return to Clarke’s afterword in which he states that music 
psychology as a discipline tends to deal with general principles rather than 
specific manifestations. As he points out, musicology tends towards the opposite 
end of the spectrum, and as an individual endeavour composition is even more 
extreme. Somehow as an individual composer writing a piece I must believe in 
the uniqueness of the piece’s expressive form, although I know that for it to have 
meaning for an audience it must also have ‘partial commonality’ with other 
pieces. Thinking about musical or artistic scenes (such as New York in the 1960s, 
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Paris in the 1920s) as ecological niches allows us to understand this apparent 
contradiction, in the same way that an ant, if it could cognize such things, would 
probably believe that it was acting with complete individual freedom when it 
carries a leaf along a trail of pheromones, even as its behaviour contributes to 
an emergent collaborative effect (the ant hill). Classical music urgently needs to 
embrace collective scenes as the outcome of emergent behaviour, rather than the 
atomizing effect of a belief in the unique expression of the individual; and the 
ecological metaphor proposed by Eric Clarke can give us the intellectual 
framework to do so.  
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Response to Eric Clarke’s  “Musical Events and Perceptual Ecologies” 
Dee Reynolds, School of Languages Lingustics and Cultures, University of 
Manchester. 
 
Adapting the principles of ecological thinking as derived from James Gibson to 
the study of aesthetic issues develops significantly our understanding of what 
we might term, following Jan Mukařovský, the ‘aesthetic function’.10 For 
Mukařovský, the aesthetic function was not confined to art, and although he 
focussed closely on materials and techniques, he considered that the aesthetic 
function needed to be seen in relation to social contexts. He argued that ‘an 
active capacity for functioning aesthetically is not an inherent property of an 
object, even if it were deliberately created with that in mind; it only transpires 
under certain circumstances, specifically in a given social context.’11  
 
From an ecological perceptive, the aesthetic function can be seen as purely 
relational, created by what Clarke calls a ‘mutualism of perceivers and their 
environments’.  The opportunities offered to the perceiver by the musical (or 
other) materials are dependent on the nature of the relationship between 
perceiver and perceived. As Clarke points out: ‘the same musical materials afford 
widely differing degrees of complexity to listeners with different listening skills, 
orientations and histories of perceptual learning.’  However, the specific 
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properties of the object – in this case music – play a co-determining role in the 
relationship with the listener, and this means that we always need to take both 
into account. 
 
When James Gibson used the concept of affordance (influenced by Gestalt 
psychology), he was thinking primarily of behaviour, in particular adaptive 
behavior that enables organisms to function successfully in their environment 
(1966, p.73). The kinds of behaviour ‘afforded’ by properties of objects depend  
on the attributes of the organism in question. The perception of affordances 
involves identification of stimuli and also orientation to their values (p.147). In 
perceiving, we can both identify information and orient ourselves to it. These 
aspects can be intertwined, such as when we discover uses for an object by 
interacting with it, which is also a learning process. 
 
Precisely because affordance cuts across subject-object distinctions while at the 
same time embracing their interaction, it also reconciles the orientation of the 
human sciences broadly speaking towards the study of general trends and 
contexts with the concern of the aesthetician who is a specialist in a given art 
form with the detailed and technical study of the material textures of the artistic 
medium.  The attributes of the medium are crucial because, as Clarke puts it, ‘the 
music [or other medium] has attributes that are consistent with the semantic 
requirements of some interpretations and not others’. The requirements of 
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mutualism are ones that can be identified and scrutinized across a spectrum 
ranging from minutely observed features perceptible only to specialists, to the 
study of the social trends in the British dubstep scene in 2007 discussed by 
Clarke. 
 
The concept of affordance is, then, hugely useful to aesthetic enquiry across 
disciplines. However, given that it is predicated on interactions between 
organisms and environment that enable organisms to benefit from the 
opportunities offered to them for purposes that are useful to them (e.g . eating, 
resting, sheltering), this does still leave the question of what kinds of usefulness 
we are talking about in the case of ‘aesthetic’ affordances, where, as Clarke 
argues, interpretation is itself an action that can be ‘afforded’. He addresses the 
issue of how the critical function of art appears to work differently from other 
kinds of affordance, which are about enabling organisms to adapt to their 
environment, as art can foster resistance rather than adaptation. 
 
I would like to take up this point and try to push it further. It seems to me that 
enabling humans to interact better with/adapt to their environments continues 
to be a crucial function of art that is not at odds with critique, as the two often 
work together.  For instance, the foregrounding of multi-sensory experience in 
much contemporary art (see discussion by Pursey in this volume) is often seen as 
in some way compensating for the lack of sensory immediacy that characterizes 
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the digital information that is so much part of contemporary life – in other 
words, it allows us to adapt to this ‘lack’ by providing us with an alternative 
source of multisensory experience. At the same time, by virtue of making visible 
the need for such sensory interventions, art contributes to raising awareness of 
the problem of sensory deprivation in our culture, thereby fostering critique.12  
In this way, the value of aesthetic affordance for humans may be precisely to 
provide us with more satisfying ways of interacting with our environment 
(facilitating ‘adaptation’) while at the same time making us more aware of 
changes that need to be made.  
 
Finally, a point about the evolution of affordances.  Like the notion of aesthetic 
function discussed at the outset, affordances change across place and through 
time. One of the effects of aesthetic affordances is to be instrumental in 
producing such changes, through impacting on perceptual habits. We cannot 
fully predict how the environment and our lifestyles will evolve and what 
contribution human aesthetic activity will make to that process, but we can be 





1. The objection is often raised that I may be deceived: the chair may be made of 
paper and cardboard, cleverly painted to look like wood and metal, but which 
collapses when I sit on it. But this only serves to confirm the principle of 
specification: materials can be deliberately made to reflect light in a way that is 
indistiguishable from the very different materials that are being simulated. We 
can mistake a painting of a violin hanging on the back of a door, as appears in 
the Music Room at Chatsworth House in Derbyshire, England – complete with 
shadow effects and a painted ribbon suspending it from a painted peg – for a real 
violin. But this merely demonstrates that a skilled painter (Jan van der Vaardt in 
this case) can use applied pigment to reflect light in a way that, for the deceived 
viewer, is indistinguishable from the way in which varnished wood, lengths of 
thin gut, and a piece of shiny blue ribbon, also reflect light to specify the same 
objects. 
 
2. Like the painted violin (see previous note), this constitutes no counter-example 
to the ecological principle of source specification. Just as the disposition of 
pigment on a surface can generate an optic array that is indistinguishable from 
the array that specifies a real violin in real space, so also the movements of two 
loudspeaker cones can generate soundwaves arriving at my ears that may be 
indistinguishable from those that are generated by a real motorbike going past. 
 
3. As is increasingly recognised, perceptual learning (particularly auditory 
learning) starts well before birth: the human foetus has an essentially fully 
functioning auditory system about halfway through pregnancy, and there is now 
plenty of evidence that a new born infant is already strongly attuned to its 




4. The language of ‘shaping’ and ‘growth’ clearly has attractive similarities to the 
processes of shaping, growth and pruning of synaptic connections that are 
widely accepted as the basis of perceptual learning and memory (e.g. Rose 2003; 
Reybrouck and Brattico 2015). There are also affinities with connectionist models 
of human perception, as discussed in Clarke 2005, p. 25-32. 
 
5. These can be heard at: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=CJRE1y5uxOM 
(Ravel, with scrolling score) and 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=SQrb85O3HQA (Kraftwerk – the 
spectrogram is from around 0:04 – 0:10) 
 
6. A representative example of Zappa’s approach to doo-wop  can be heard at 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=NBRUcElxhJU; and Denise by Randy and 
the Rainbows at: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=xgqMW4CHClk 
 




8. For the developing literature on musical affordances see e.g. Reybrouck (2012); 
Windsor and de Bézenac (2012); and Krueger (2014). 
 
9. The network title is 'Evaluating Methods of Aesthetic Enquiry across 
Disciplines'. 
 
10. Mukařovský (1891-1975) was a member of the Prague Linguistic Circle and 
was also known for his association with Russian Formalism. His best known text 




Accessed 2 March 2018. 
 
12. See, for instance, this discussion of the Open Senses festival held in London, 
May 2017: ‘Singer [Stephanie Singer, composer and founder of Bittersuite] thinks 
the reason so many people are interested in the multi-sensory (or multi-modal) 
field right now is because the rocketing use of technology has resulted in less 
physical interaction in a society ever more divided by screens. “The festival 
comes at a time when we are experiencing a lack of intimacy in our daily lives,” 
she says. “Digital is great, but digital needs to come with a human element... 
Technologists are thinking about how to make tech more synonymous with the 
body, to move beyond clunky technology.”’. 
https://www.standard.co.uk/go/london/arts/open-senses-festival-how-a-
multisensory-extravaganza-is-heightening-the-capitals-delights-a3535061.html. 
Accessed 04.03.18.  
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